feat: I think this is a better firewall setup, still need to properly test it

applications/firewall.nix

@@ -58,8 +58,23 @@
     # beware of EOL conversion.
     networking.nftables.ruleset =
       ''
-      # Check out https://wiki.nftables.org/ for better documentation.
+      # using https://oxcrag.net/2021/12/25/build-your-own-router-with-nftables-part-1/ as a guide
-      # Table for both IPv4 and IPv6.
+
+      # Clear out any existing rules
+      flush ruleset
+
+      # Our future selves will thank us for noting what cable goes where and labeling the relevant network interfaces if it isn't already done out-of-the-box.
+      # red cabled
+      define WANLINK = eno1
+      # yellow cable
+      define LANLINK = eno2
+
+
+      # We never expect to see the following address ranges on the Internet
+      define BOGONS4 = { 0.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 10.64.0.0/10, 127.0.0.0/8, 127.0.53.53, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.0.0/24, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 240.0.0.0/4, 255.255.255.255/32 }
+
+
+      # Network address translation: What allows us to glue together a private network with the Internet even though we only have one routable address, as per IPv4 limitations
       table ip nat {
         chain prerouting {
           type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept;
@@ -84,46 +99,69 @@
         }
       }
 
-      table ip filter {
-        chain input {
-          type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;
 
+      # The actual firewall starts here
+      table inet filter {
+        # Additional rules for traffic from the Internet
+        chain inbound_world {
+          # this is actually a good idea
+          # Drop obviously spoofed inbound traffic
+          ip saddr { $BOGONS4 } drop
+        }
+
+        # Additional rules for traffic from our private network
+        chain inbound_private {
+          # We want to allow remote access over ssh, incoming DNS traffic, and incoming DHCP traffic
           # for the host machiene
+          # hardcoded in so that we can always have access
+          tcp dport 22 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+
           # TCP
           ${lib.strings.concatMapStrings (x: x + "\n") (map (port: "tcp dport ${toString port} counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept") config.skynet_firewall.own.ports.tcp)}
 
           # UDP
           ${lib.strings.concatMapStrings (x: x + "\n") (map (port: "udp dport ${toString port} counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept") config.skynet_firewall.own.ports.udp)}
+
         }
 
-        chain forward {
+        # Our funnel for inbound traffic from any network
-          type filter hook forward priority filter; policy drop;
+        chain inbound {
-          counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump rejects
+          # Default Deny
+          type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop;
 
-          # accept these ip/ports
+          # Allow established and related connections: Allows Internet servers to respond to requests from our Internal network
-          # ip saddr 193.1.99.123 tcp dport 443 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+          ct state vmap { established : accept, related : accept, invalid : drop} counter
+
+          # ICMP is - mostly - our friend. Limit incoming pings somewhat but allow necessary information.
+          ip protocol icmp icmp type {
+            destination-unreachable, echo-reply, echo-request, source-quench, time-exceeded
+          } limit rate 5/second accept
+
+          # guy must have had a lot of trouble with spoofed ips
+          # Drop obviously spoofed loopback traffic
+          iifname "lo" ip daddr != 127.0.0.0/8 drop
+
+          # Separate rules for traffic from Internet and from the internal network
+          iifname vmap { lo: accept, $WANLINK : jump inbound_world, $LANLINK : jump inbound_private }
+        }
+
+        # Rules for sending traffic from one network interface to another
+        chain forward {
+          # Default deny, again
+          type filter hook forward priority 0; policy drop;
+
+          # Accept established and related traffic
+          ct state vmap { established : accept, related : accept, invalid : drop }
+
+          # Let traffic from this router and from the Internal network get out onto the Internet
+          iifname { lo, $LANLINK } accept
+
+          # Only allow specific inbound traffic from the Internet (only relevant if we present services to the Internet).
+          # tcp dport { $PORTFORWARDS } counter
 
           # can basically make each machiene responsibile for their own forwarding (in config at least)
           ${lib.strings.concatMapStrings (x: x + "\n") config.skynet_firewall.forward}
 
-          counter packets 0 bytes 0 reject with icmp type admin-prohibited
-        }
-
-        chain output {
-          type filter hook output priority filter; policy accept;
-
-          # no outgoing limits (for now)
-        }
-
-        chain fail2ban-ssh {
-          # ban these
-          # ip saddr 104.236.151.120 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
-          counter packets 0 bytes 0 return
-        }
-
-        chain rejects {
-          # Reject all these
-          # ip saddr 220.119.33.251 counter packets 0 bytes 0 reject with icmp type admin-prohibited
         }
       }
       '';